Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1983

Linda M. Olson v. Kenneth Olson : Brief of Appellant Linda M.
Olson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.John G. Marshall; Attorney for Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Olson v. Olson, No. 19280 (1983).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4721

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE

OF UTAH

LINDA M. OLSON,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
Supreme Court No. 19280

vs.
KENNETH OLSON,
Defendant and
Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
LINDA M. OLSON

Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County, Honorable David B. Dee, Judge

JOHN G. :VIARSHALL
525 East 300 South
Suite 102
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorney for Appellant
Mary Lou Godbe
313 Kearns Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah

84101

Attorney for Respondent

FI l ED
AUG ;, G i98J

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE

OF UTAH

LINI1.\ \1.

Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.

Supreme Court No. 19280

l\f.N NETll

Defendant and
Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
LINDA M. OLSON

\ppeal from the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake r:'ounty, Honorable David B. Dee, Judge

JOHN G. :\IARSHALL
525 East 300 South
Suite 102
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorney for Appellant
\I Ei.f\' Lo11
odbe
l l 8 I\ C':trns llldp;.

Salt Lah•· ''1\v, t't11t1

.q4101

TABLE OF C'O\JTE\JTS
NATURE OF THE CASE . . . . . .
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

2

STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL.
POINT ONE:
THE PROPERTY SETTLEVIENT DECREED
FAILED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE VALL'E OF
THE EARNING ABILITY OF TIIE nEFENOANT, OR IF THE
SA\1E WAS CONSIDERED, THE DECREE WAS ARBITRARY
AND CAPRICIOUS .\ND GROSSLY INADEQUATE IN THE
.\:\10UNT AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF.
POICIT TWO: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WITH RESPECT TO THE AWARD OF ..\LI:\10NY .'\S TO THE
A:\10UNT AND THE DURATION or THE AWARD.
ARGU:VIENT . .

21

CONCLUSION.

CASES CITED

Dahlberg vs. Dahlberg, 77 U. 157. 292 Pac. 214.
English vs. Engfr;h, 565 P .2d 409 (llt. 1977).
'.V1acLean vs. \1acLcan, 12:\ P.2d

11
. l 7. 18

(Ct. 1974).

13

Savage vs. Savage, 658 P.2d lc01 lt;t. 1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 19
Steinbrenner vs. Steinbrenner, e;o Or.

\pp. 106, 652 P.2d 845. . . . . .

19

\\'e,

1<>11,i:ow vs. IVestenskow, 062 P.2d 1246 (Ut. 1977). . . . . • . • . .

18

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
!\ rauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse's Education:

Le al Protection for the vi arital Investor of Human Ca ital,
28 l\an. L. Rev. 379 1980 .. . . .
. . . . . . . . • • •

9

Ltrndes, Economics of '°l.limony, 7 J. Legal Stud. 35 (1978). . . . . . . .

9

ST A TUT ES CITED
Section 30-3-o U.C.A . . . . .

21

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE

OF UTAH
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N,\TCRE OF THE

This is an action f,,r

in "l11eh the

R

:1Jso <oua;ht

:-i

property settlement, child s11011ort :rna ali:nonv.

LO\I LI{

UISPO:SITJI>'<

On \lay 13, 198:3. t!1e lot.'<?r

settlement, Hnd awarrh_-(J oiutntiff

1• 1)tJrt

>?ntcr<><j :1

•!11li-1 -;urpnrt

-1-

(frJr

(lecrec of divorce in

three :11inor

in

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant Linda \I. Olson seeks reversal of the decree as to the
prnpertv settlement and the alimony decreed, but not from the entry of the
decree of divorce.

STATE\1ENT OF FACTS
Appellant

and

defendant

were

married

on

December

approximately six months after plaintiff graduated from high school.
time plaintiff was eighteen years old.
the marriage.

21,

1960,

At that

Six children have been born as issue of

As of the date of the decree of divorce, three children were

emancipated and three children (ages 16, 11 and 3 years) resided with the
plaintiff, who was awarded custody of the said three minor children.

The

parties separated approximately two years before the trial when defendant
went on a trip and didn't return to the home of the parties.
called him, defendant said he was not returning home.

When appellant

(R. 85.) The evidence

does not disclose any other basis for the separation of the parties, which
resulted in the divorce.
At the time of the marriage, plaintiff was employed by Utah Power
and Light doing typing work. She worked at that employment for approximately
six months after the marriage at which time she quit her employment because
she was five months pregnant.

(R. 81.)

Thereafter she was a full-time homemaker who bore and raised

the

six cl1ildren of the parties and provided a home for the defendant and their
"ilildren.

(R.

82.)

-2-

As A consequencP.
in the h1bor

substantial sense

h;1s nPver
n.8rk0t

'_i;aintullv

in

(e\:CPDt f·x :)!J.!'t-t1mP, rninirnurn

1

jobs since the filing of the compl!l.int lwre1nl. 'in<1 'I"'

11'1'

no training .vllicll

would suit her for gainful emplovme11t 11t tl1c time of tl1c entrv of tlw c'ecree.

(R. 81-83.)
On the other han11, the defendR.nt <111ring tl1e course of the marriage
worked and supported the famil\.

\t 111,, time of the trial herein he had

formed his own consulting company, known as Ricl1t1rc:s which is a Utah corporation.

IR. lll6.)

Olson

\ssociates,

Tl1P husin<'ss of tile defendant. either

personally or through his cor·poration c-onsists of personal services in consulting
primarily

a variet_1:

g0vernmental organizations on organizational 'Tiatterc;,

such as the evaluation of <late governments anr1 state o;ovcrnment organizati0ns,
the operations

of

governor's offices

governments generallv.

and

other

acti\'ities

to

stnte

For example hetween 1979 an<1 1981, the ,jefendant

had a contract with the Dec>art.nent rif State Hnd the State of Utah to PVa!uate
the impact of the \IX '.J1ssile System at one t11ne planned to IJe loc:it.cd in
Utah.

!R. I 04-108.)
Defendant testified tli>H the tvpical mnnrwr 0f conducting tl1P bllsiness

was to enter into consul ting cont mets on either !l. -;hart-term (two to three
months) or a lon[(-term (one ve·1r to eight••en months) lx1s1s.

m.

104.)

The

defendant's te'ilimonv in<11C'8te.J th:it lie hMI '>een Able to huild the ':lusiness to
the point

NhPrc it

1

of this matter.

w11-.;, (Jevl'lop11•'-.'.," c;1Jtl':-tant1al 1nt•nr;H" at the tune of the trial

While the ti?stimnn': of d(·fPnrlnnt ,11owed

fluctuated sorne,xl10.t

1J1Jt)fl

the· r•nntr·ic•t<.::

lfl

that hie;; incorne

f'or(•e at ;1n

11

tirn<>.

t :,.,

'''''"'t fu1md tilat defendant produced a gross income in 1980 in the amount

nnd in 1981 in the amount of $62,603.00 (R. 60).

,f

The defendant

also test1f1Pd tliat at the time of the trial his salary annualized (based upon
tl1e first pRrt of the year) would figure out to "something like $67 ,000.00 per
1ear.'' (R. 106.)

This approximates the court's finding to the effect that in

1982 defendant had produced a gross income in the amount of $57,000.00 to
the time of trial (Oct. 4, 1982) and that he believed he would obtain another
contract which he was negotiating at that time, which would produce income
to defendant in the amount of $3,500.00 per month (R. 60.) over the remaining
three months of 1982.

This would produce an additional income of $10,500.00,

or a total of $67,500.00 for 1982.
Plaintiff testified that she had filed a financial declaration with the
court prior to the time of the trial which showed that the average living
expenses of the family for the last years prior to the separation amounted to
$5,500.00 per month.

(R. 85.) She testified that she felt she needed $4,200.00

per month to maintain the household as it had been maintained, taking into
!1ccount the e:-.-penses of herself and three minor children residing at home.

rR. 87.) The financial declaration filed by defendant showed his monthly living
expense to be $2,837.00 (R. 115.).
In its decree of divorce, the lower court ordered among other things:
'l)

That defende.nt should pay to plaintiff as alimony the sum of $1,600.00

oer ,nontil, which should continue for only two years, after which alimony
-;l10uld ('ease.

b)

ThHt defendant 'hould pay to plaintiff for the care and

n1ni11ten11nce of the minor cl1ilrlren of the parties $200.00 per child, which

-.;ef1c 1nl

eighteen and graduate'S frorn

The <Jecree of rJivor<:'e cil'o nr,1crcrl

!11...: or hf'r
Fl

(•li1s...;.

division of propPrtv ;-iccumulfltcrl

during the marriaise, which will '>e st1te<J in cnnrc cld:1il '">elow.

ST\TE',JENT OF P<ll'HS O'l

\PPE\L

POINT ONE. THE PIWPEl<fY SETTLE\lENT DECREED F.\ILED TO
TAKE INTO CONSIDER,\TION Tl IE \ ALL:E OF
L\R'l!NG .\R!L!TY OF
THE DEFEND ..\ NT, OR Ir THr: SA \l[ \V \S <"(l'lSirlER[D, TllE DECREE 11'.\S
..\RBITRARY AND CAPRICHlCS \Nil GIWSSL Y l'l \DEQU,\TE IN T!!E
..\ \!OU'.'JT AIV:\RDED TO PL.\IN rJFr.
POlNT TWO. THF THL.\L COl'RT \f;L'S[n ITS !)!SCRETION \\'ITH
RESPE1_'T TO T!lF .\I\ \RU OF \Ll\IONY \S T() TllE .\ \lOL'NT AND TllE
DllR.\TlON OF TllE AIVARD.
\RGL'\IF'lT
POINT ONE
THE
PROPERTY
SETTLE\ICNT
DECREFD
F \ILEll
TO
L\l\E
INTO
CONSIDERATIO:\
r1JE
\ \LUE OF
fl![
J:.\ll'll\JC
.\BIUTY OF TllE
DEFENDANT. OR IF Tiff SA\lE \\ \S CO'lO'IDEREll. Till: llECREE \V \S
ARBITRARY AND C.\PRICIOUS :\ND CIWSSLY IN.\IJF:QL'\TE IC: TllE
AWARDED TO PL \l'lT!FF.
The trial court

Jp:wll:rnt the """ of the familv home until

the first of the f01iowing »ec-11rr1•r, es:
0

b.

Until thl' humc"

c.

l'ntil

'H'

1;

'lfTi(''

,Jr

,\'1th

'l

·n:1n to ·1,ho·n .:.;he is

l:pon the happening of the first of the above events, the home was
ornered to be sold and the proceeds of the sale divided equally between the
p11rti es.
The trial court divided the property between the parties as follows:
To plaintiff (appellant):

To defendant (respondent):

a.

One-half the equity in
the family home upon sale
(no value specified).

a.

One-half the equity ·in
the family home upon sale
(no value specified).

b.

Her personal effects and
jewelry (no value specified).

b.

His personal effects (no value
specified).

c.

Furniture, fixtures and appliances
located at the family home (no
value specified).

c.

:vlembership in the Sports \fall
(having a value of $1,200.00).

d.

1977 Chevrolet automobile

d.

1980 Buick Skylark automobile

e.

The
professional
business.

f.

The retirement account (having a
value of $15,359.00).

consulting

With respect to the value of the home, the appellant estimated it to
be worth approximately $170,000.00 less a mortgage on the premises in the
amount of $33,000.00 leaving a net equity of $137,000.00.

She apparently

formed her opinion based on a valuation given her by a realtor.

(R. 17.)

Respondent on the other hand testified that in his opinion, the value of the
liome was 5235,000.00 less a mortgage of approximately $29,000.00 which would
le'l'IC u n"t equity of $206,000.00. According to his testimony he based his

'lninio11 on "watching comparable sales in the area during the time when the

l'<eal estate market was moving."
llic

t1

(R. ll8.)

However, he also admitted that

rne when real estate was moving was approximately two years before

-6-

the time of the tri8.l, that hl'

1

ll't-'n

r

11

1t '11lP thP '-t.1tP nf

f0r

the year prior to the trial, c1n« th,1t 111' '"" ""t :rn"1re of :1m· "lie' of real
estate in the neighborhooci wher0

!'Rrnil\' l1ome 1<; lo1"1tPd dllring that year.

(R. 128.)
With respect to t11e f11rnit11r('. f1Jrn1sl1ir1gs :in11 0quirment located in
the family home, the respondent tPst1f1ed tll!lt in his opinion the value w::is

$20,000.00.

iloweve1', on <'ro-ss examination he testified that

(R.

that was his estimate of the llmount it
for insurance purposes.

(R. 1

.)

would take to reolace the furniture

rlw;, of course, does not indicate anything

about t11e age and present <'ontJi\ion of the furnit11re, and it i'i not the stand,mi
for rictermining its value !which is what a willing buver would pay to a willing
seller).

He also st3ted \fiat

the furniture

were sold, as for example at a garage ..;ale.

woultJ not vield verv much if it

IR. I ?8.)

Furti1ermore, there is

evidence that not all the furniture, fixtures and appliancr>s were awarded to
plaintiff.

(See R. 2o where defer1dant proposed "Each party should he awarded

the household furnishings . . . now in r1i'i 0r h<'r rossc>ssi0n.")

It 1s respectfullv

submitted that the award nf the furniture was based upon the needs of the
family and that any !lct1rnl VAiue of these items was immaterial.
It is clear thnl the item ,,f rno..;t "'lbstanti:ll value which the parties
had accumulated

their

business, which the tr1AI

>!DHrt frail! tlw home. was t:1e consulting

•:ollrt :iwar'•lecl ent11·"i'I to

the resDondent

without

determining its value.
The

evidenee

.vJtl1

summarized in the Statement A

tn
!'·wt':,

the

')f

·1l1ovel inc1iC':1tes t11:1t.

defencbnt

(:1s

while at

tllf•

time 0f the trial the defendant had no signed contracts, he believed he would
ulJlain a contract which he was then negotiating (R. 105) and that the average
earn1nf;s of the business over the last three years was $68,862.67 per year.

m.

110-11?.)

The average earnings of the defendant for the prior three year period
gives a fairly accurate indication of the defendant's earning ability.

However,

it is clear from the remarks at the trial court at the conclusion of the trial,
that the defendant's earning ability was not taken into account by the trial
court in determining the property settlement decreed.
In summary, the court stated as follows:
"In order for you to survive and your wife to survive you're going to
have to sell your house and live on that money and both of you rent
and do away with all of the things which you've now enjoyed while
you were married. There is no way you can maintain two households
at the same level you maintained one on your present producing-free
income unless you get a business contract.

"! don't think I'm willing to speculate with your wife's life and your

children's lives of you getting a big contract. It looks the only way
we can get this worked out is to sell that house." (R. 129-130).

Therefore, the trial court ordered that the family home be sold in a maximum
of two years (i.e., when the oldest child reaches eighteen years of age) and
the proceeds divided equally among the parties, apparently for the purpose of
p1·ov1<1ing them with a resource to live on.
tn

1'1e

However, the court also awarded

deferi<1ant the full interest in the business and the retirement account

.vh1<"t1 !1C1d been built up during the course of the marriage.
Economists view the family as a decision-making unit which allocates
its ·1v·1ila>ilc "csources for the mutual good of the family unit, by joint decision.

-8-

See. J(r:iuskopf Rerornpense for \111nn1•inC'.

i .;1J('·1t1nn:

»< ''''"·

for the \1arital Investor of llurn•in r_::_ri,,11 d.

Pr()tc:r•t1on

I.. p,.,..

17'1 .. lH•; 11 '.l80l.

Trac'.itionally, after marriage, couples 1'hons1• !11 h:1\'<' 1.v1vrs 1lcvot0 full or parttime to housekeeping nn<i child-»:irc :11'!1 v1t10s. \Vhik tilL·v· ·1ho ehoos0 to have
husbands devote their full

tune to cmpln•;ment

in t!w lahor market.

consequence over Ute years of n

\s

1

ltH.' h11shi:i.nd inrr0;:ises hi.:;;

skills in income-producing activ1t1es finrl tra11\lng, nnd

ilso '"lcqu1rcs seni•)rit:;

rights anrl pension benefits, while the wife incre'1S«s Iler 11bilitv anr1 skill in

and nurturing activitif's, :'tit srtrr1fier;-.; the trninini:;. c\'.oe:it:nee
and seniority bendits whieh she 11·011lrl neP<1 1f she •.v·ore required to provice
for her own ·•uooort.
The traditional div1'1on of

does ')endit t11e fnmilv 1mit, ho1•:evcr,

by maximizing the husband's earning CRpHcitv.

The wife's work nt home frees

the husband to eoneentrR.te ·)n h1"

;ii

for the family.

1rr1ed 'nen t1qving higher lif»tir,1e eRrninr;s

This results 111

and longer. healthier lives

'Tl

·1r ..:et work

the nc·n1ll;;:.ition of pro9ert:.,:

1

thc-tll 1m1narrierl mPn.

SeP L2nrlec;, Ec0n0rn!('S of

7 J. Le<:;al Stud. :J'i.
signifie::rntly reduces the 'thilit" nf ·.v1vt>--; to
required

to

do

so

t>ecqu-;e

•)I

t:ieir

mcome. sho1Jlrj thP\' bf'

•1f

laC'k

of sKilb in

nqrl1"inAtion,

trnining

Rnci

.wL1v1111:-.;.

These fHctors havi:> dirr> 1 •t
of this case "how

of labor

t'1i<

the

cJ[1DlH"1t1fln

1111rn·1r1

t,\

hnr.

ThP

f11C"t'-'

'tftcr tl1(' ·vife ·:2_"r.·idtinted

·11·1r'"i"'(4

from high schno! :1nd hefr)rl' <;;.1l0 ·.v,i" ·i!'I"
marriage the part1e<:, :llloC':1t(i'

t•) tt10

"•'IJ!·\cr

1"1,)it.11

nf

'UJ\'

j()h

thi-.; n1_'\\'

L'rvJn the

!'·1:nJ\\' 1tnit

in

·''''"'"'',,,,item, ''Ith the result that for the next twenty-two years the

11, .. ,.

rt· rJ,.1,,,tP•I her f11ll-time activity to homemaking and nurturing activities and
11"' 1111,lltrnri dev,)t 0 d his full-time activities to earning a living, which in the
0 11"'

:it hrtr 0nhc1nced his skills to the point where he became a counselor to

gcivernors Rnd other governmental entities, and developed a business with an
ineo111e-proclu0ing capacity averaging over $68,000.00 per year for the most
recent

three-year

period

prior to

the

time of

the

trial.

Under these

circumstances, it is grossly inequitable to terminate this marriage without
taking into account the wife's right to receive a fair and equitable share of
this earning capacity, which she helped produce, in a division of the property
Accumulated 'w the parties during the marriage.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized a wife's right to receive a
fair and equitable share of such financial benefits.

In the case of Savage vs.

SRvao-e, 8:i8 P.2d 1201 (1983) the facts were somewhat similar to the facts in
the c11se at bar.

In that case the parties were married about twenty years.

However, unlike the present case, the wife in the Savage case had some earning
abilitv in thst she had a college degree and had taught school for two years
after t11e marriag-e.

Thereafter she was a full-time homemaker and caretaker

for the three children of the parties.

Even though the husband had been

o':c11p1ed 11urinr:>; the full term of the marriage (and even before the marriage) in
a busi11es'i ow11ed by his family, the court awarded the wife 4096 of the stock
rn th·1t
11,

,rrr

'111;,n<>>S

rr w

.vt11el1 lwd been accumulated by the parties during their

ltustiand

" 11r1r1•!ne 1 'otirt of

ohJC'Cterl to this property settlement.

Ltah st ited:

-10-

On appeal the

"In view of the '20-ve.·lr
nf tl11..;;
nnd tlw [:i.(lt
that both parties
full-t1:iw .,rr J1't' thr,,11g>1n11t t'1Ht
period to the e11ds of the m11rriai;;e. \1\
-.;r'f' no 1dJthE' nf
discretion in the 40"n nO \, split fash1onc<1 hi' tile trial l'OUrt.
Virtuallv the eutire [)resent val1Ji' of the C'orpnr.1tions \\'as
developed during thP m·1rria:,;e .Jn<1, wl1ilc it is true tl111t the
plaintiff took no responsibilitv for the L111sincss, 1t was her
assumption of the c101T1c>>tiC' b11r<1ens whi"h madr possi'ile the
defendant's full-time oarti<'1p:it1on in the husincss.
She is
therefore entitled tn a .fair and equitablP s!wr1, of the finilne1al
benefits A.ecumulflted bv virtue of their ioint dforts in the
marriage."
1

•'

The case of Dahlber"' vs. nahlherrr, 77 Ut. 157. 292 Pcic.

0

1;, also recoi:;nile'1

the right of a wife to share in the propertv acquired durinc:; the 11rnrriage.
The case involved a divorce of parties who ha<1 hc-en :l1flrried t1·1entv-seven
years.

Four children hac! been !Jorn as issue of the marriagP, two of whom

were living with tlie wife at tlie time of the divorce.

The trial <'ourt h11d

awarded the ,vife approximately one-thirrl of the value of the propertv ac<iuired
by the parties during the rn11rrwge 1rnrl 5he contended th:it ,11e 'l10uld have
received one-half.

In its .Jel'1s1,1n the l'tah Suorcrne C'o11rt st:ited as follows:

"It is the contentiUn •)i the plaintiff th·it. in view th:it the
parties harl been rna1T1c>c1 nnd lived together fr:ir more thcrn
a quarter of a <'enturv, reared a fa1nilv, acqu1l'eci :ill of the
property ::iossessicd b\' teem through their J•iint eff,Jrts, that
all of the real es trite Rnd oersnnal orooert 1· oo"e'"ed >w
them, though held in thP n:ime of U1e defendant: w>lS JUSt il.s
much her property i ' t!wt uf 11er hu,111\nd . . . . an equitrtblc>
division of the propertv re<Juircd t11at ;he be :1w,1rdcd 8.t le:1st
one-half of the value <lf the Joint prope>rty: .
"In oorosition t0 Urnt 1t
that as A gener;:tJ r11[1:. lrl
of the husband
Jr()oert·
1

lhc f'()rltr>!lt1on of the rlPfPndnnt
1rll\' .thOUt Gne--thir<j

)<:::

rlJ VfJrc•p

..:;

l'-l ,1'•':1rdr('

u,

1

t!1P

.v1f<·: . . . .

* * * * *
1
\\e thin\-: the rul('
correet r1Jl0 Y.nr1 i--; .r1
jurisdiction. <)f <'O!H"-)(_,

'

h\ tl1c
t'1i> Ld,'r

lqr·

:Jr'('

''<'lt!1

ril.11rit1t'f
r"':hP...;

r)f '·1r>tl:

t!.C'

-l l-

1s

frnr:-i

tht·
tt11'-

iHrtJr>-.,

·1rP to r,e considered, but, whatever doubt there may be
•«JfW<>rning the matter, it ought to be resolved against the
guilt> p11rty whose faults and wrongs and breaches of the
•11a1·1tal relation destroyed the home and forced or brought
11l1011t the separation.
"In flecker vs. Decker supra, the court said 'It is also a rule
of e•1uity in such cases that the wife shall not be put in a
worse condition by reason of lier marriage, the dissolution of
whieh has been caused by her husband's willful misconduct.
Equity and good conscience require that the husband shall
not profit by his own wrong, . . . and also that a fair division
shall be made taking into consideration the relative wants,
circumstances and necessities of each, of the property
f!Ccumulated by their joint efforts and savings.' "
The supreme court concluded that under the facts cited above the interest of
the plaintiff in "the whole of the property" accumulated through their joint
<>fforts was equal to that of the husband and modified the decree accordingly.
In the case at bar it is clear that the court would have to award the
ownership of the business accumulated by the parties to the defendant, because
the business, in essence, consists of his training and experience and demonstrated
earning capacity, together with a pension account which had been accumulated
in his name.
Ilowever. it is .1lso equally clear that the trial court could, and should,
have awarded to the plaintiff a share of the value of that business, equal to
the interest which she helped to create.

While no evidence was introduced at

the time of the trial in the nature of an appraisal of the value of the business
:iwnrded to plaintiff, the facts indicated by the average earning capacity of
tt1e business would lend themselves to a mathematical computation of the value
nf the
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For example, defenJnnt was -l'.1
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rate until he reached age li'.i. 01'er tl1:1t 11•.·r1od l11s IJusincss would prnducc
total
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income of

There

are

,tcinrlurd

aceountinq;

determining the present value of n stream of future ineome.
of return at

tables

11

for

\ssuming a rate

lO"'u per :rnnum (the legtll interest ri!te), the present v11lue of
and one-half of that amount

that total income would be

would

be 5293,1:33.37.
There are many factors, not presently foreseeciblc which could operate
to di1nin1sh that value, such as the p0ss1bilit) of future ill health, so that it
may not ':le reasoneb!P to •1ward 8.ppellant tlrnt full amount as being one-half
the Vdlue of the business.

However, it sl10uld be clear that there is a substantial

value in the business which the court sho11!d have dividerl.
There 11re a variety of methods which the court could have adopted
in dividing this asscl. 0lher tl111n a lump sum cash award.
court could have awarrlcd 8p[lellant
of the business (up to

A

for the v3.lue of the business tl1at wR.s

jointly developed to t.he cjatc nf the

supra.

fixerJ percentag-e of the annual income

fi'oss annual income of the business of

This would fairly cornpensatP

defendunt.

g

For example, the

;;nc1 [c>qve any future growth to

This 1s similar to the res11lt decided UDOn in the SavaP-e c11se,

In the Savn>2:e c>11se, "1pr·1. tl1e ma3ority noted and the dissent urged

that whenever [lOSsil1le "'"1t1nue<1 1ntPr•1ct1un ll\ reC1s0n of joint ownership b\'
divorced spouses in

1

hl·ld r•nt0ror1S(' ')]1ould hP n voirled, -;o thR.t

\not her

· 11.i.' 111• 1·11 1i:ve 1•.n1Jld he to fix a value of the business to be awarded to
''"r"'lirnt,

1nr1 nermit <1efcn<1nnt to oav it in installments.

A more practical

<0111 t1on w•11Jid tw to award the appellant the full equity in the family home
•)f tile pal'\1es

11s

an offset for the value of the business, which should have

hcen aw11rded to appellant.

Or the court could adopt any combination of the

foregoing or other alternatives.

POINT TWO
'!'HE TRfA.J. \OURT A.BUSED !TS DISCRETION WITH RESPECT TO THE
,\\V
OF ..\11\"!0NY AS TO THE
AND THE DURATION OF THE
·\s noted in the Statement of Facts the trial court awarded the
plaintiff $1,600.00 per month as alimony, but limited the award of alimony to
two years.

In its original memorandum decision the court ordered the plaintiff

to pay alimony in the sum of $1,600.00 per month, but put no limit on the
time the alimony was to be paid. (R. 51.)

Subsequently on November 9, 1982,

counsel for plaintiff and defendant appeared before the trial judge.

A record

was kept of the proceedings, in which the trial court indicated that the purpose
of the hearing

was for the court to explain the order it had heretofore entered

und to hanc1le an objection by the defendant that he could not pay what the
court hac1 ordererJ.
In the course of the proceeding, the court indicated that it would be
w1ll1nc; tr, »1rns1der that the aliinonv be for a limited period of time although
Counsel for defendant suggested a ten
ve·1r terrn

·1n11 the eo11rt rc-;pon1Jed "that's too long".
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Thereafter the court

can start retraining herself.' 1

:'.uh-.;t-''jllt_'fil !'.· till' c•o11rt -;t.J.tPd:

"! thinl< st1e's got to g• t out nnd lc1kr e:irP 0[ her'<:•lf.

She
just cannot sit ':lack ·rnrl get
a m0nth from tl1is
fellow and rlo nothing to help "lpport >wrsetf. Soc1ctv doesn't
tolerate that from :rn\' nf u<s. That"; wllv ·ve 11rP all Prnploved .
..\nd she hns just t'1c
ol•lig•1tions to take care of herself
as we all hRve." m. 11G-l 111.l
0

Thereafter the court .:ntererl its ordPr limiting the o>iyment of ll!imonv
(at the rnte of 51,600.00 oer month) to " period of twn \'Pars from the date
of the entry of the decree.
In the cRse At bar 1t is clenr frn1n

c<>n1 men ts of the trial jude-e

th3.t he .Jir: not take into c•)nsid<'rntion the husl)anrl's c>Hrning :ibilitv or the
realistic li'rntations on the wife's e•irning <'np;11•itv. in 11eter:nining the alimony
to be awarded to the wife.

Rather,

it nrpcars

that

he disr<'garrled

these

important factors and focuseJ. inste&<1, upon tiH' aC'tunl 0arnings of the hushHnd
at the time the decree .vqs entered

in

deciding the ,qrnoJJnt .vi1ich was to be

awarded as alimony and the IPn§'.th of time it ''''" t•) be pHid.
Prior to the trial 8Pp»llant had fikd a finirn<'ial declaration with the
court which showed that !.fie

liv1nQ" c"pe1bes of the fwnilv

the

three years preceding the '<eDHntion amo1mtr>d to 5-,,:ilJIJ.OO rer month.
18).

\t the trinl she test1fiecJ th:d tl11:-; :1ilnr·nati•J11 wns

showing

the

Hctual amount
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c'1wnws

f<Jr

'•JITlP
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upon ehec1's
\CMS

prior

tn

the

Siw 1C'stif1erl
however that she felt she neu1e<J

ri•·r 11•)nth t•J "in1nt:un t!h'

'"": '""'n 1wuntained, triking into account the expenses of herself and
1111 ,.,. :n1n"r 1•hildren residing at home.

(R. 87.)

The financial declaration

f1i<'d l1v .Jcfcrid11nt sl10wed his monthly living expense to be $2,837.00 (R. 24,
l I 1).

The evidence showed that during the two years that the parties were
'Ppi!r.1ted before the trial, the defendant paid directly to the plaintiff $1,200.00
per :nonth for her support and the support of the minor children who were
\1v1ng 'ft horn<?, and that in addition he also paid directly the bills and other
expen"'' of the appellant and the children (R. 85).

The defendant confirmed

thi' and testifierl that his experience was that it cost $800.00 to $1,000.00
per :n0nth to maintain the home (which he identified as principal, interest,
t:nes 1ind insurance on the home), which he had also been paying in addition
to t11e bills Rnd in addition to the $1,200.00 per month which he paid to the
;:ilarntiff (R. 119-120).
The amount awarded by the trial court for the support of the appellant
and the children (Sl,600.00 per month alimony together with $200.00 per month
per child for three children -

or a total of $600.00 for child support -

which

totals 52,200.UO per month) is a fair approximation of the amount that the
def<:nd1rnt testified he was actually paying directly to the appellant and toward
tlie exrenscs of maintaining the home during the separation, but would not
include the other amounts defendant was paying during the separation.
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ln the case of [nc>lish vs. En·rlisl1, .1•i'1 I'

c•:

411'.I (l't. I

t!lh r•ourt

stated:
. . the court stated that the most i:nport:int function of
alimony is to provide support for the wife ;is nearlv as possihle
at the standard of living she enjoyed during mHrriage A.nd to
prevent the wife from hecoming H puhlic ch11rge. The court
observed that criteria considered in determining a reasonable
award for support and maintenance include the financial
conditions and needs of the wife, the nbility of the wife to
produce a sufficient income for herself, and the ability of
the husband to provide support."

1f in making this awrtrd, the trial court took into consideration the
needs of the plaintiff and the minor children for support, and the Rbility of
the husband to pav for their support, and the rrbilitv of the wife to contribute
to her own support, it failed to clarify the matter 1rnvwhere in the findings
of fact, conclusions of law or .Judgment.
The average earnings of the defendant for the three years preceding
the entry of the decree (defendant's historic earning rrbility) amounted to more
than

per month.

1f ttiat factor was properlv consirler<?d b\' the trial

court, there would not appear to '>e any reason in the evidence to justifv C!n
award of alimony A.nd chi\<1 support so far below what the appellant estimated
would be necessary for her ·ilJpport, so far helow whRt the husband had :1lre11dv
been

pRving during the sepnrntion, rind rarticularlv so far below what the

evidence demonstrated would he necessCJ.rV to :naintain her and the
as near\v as possible to the st:in<!nrd of livim:; t!W\' enJO\'ed during the rnarriage .
...\lthough the findinl(s don't

on, it

would A.ppear that t:1e co11rt

.vhic!1 income level the ·-d11nony
'Nn'i
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1
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hasi:i<e: t:1e :wiount •Wrlerc'<i rrn t!w

,,.,,,,11,1 <lc>re1HJant was earning at the time of trial, rather than on defendant's
lll,Jor1•' f':irning ability, contrary to the holdings of this court in Westenskow
'"· \\ <>'1•'r\Skow, .162 P.2d 1246 (Ut. 1977), and English vs. English, supra.

For

tilP pf'otect1on of both parties (in the event a need should arise to request a

morlificRtion based upon a change of circumstances) this matter should be
clarified.
Furthermore, the termination of alimony at an arbitrarily selected
date was, in the circumstances of this case, a clear abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court.

In the English case, supra, the court held that one

of the most important functions of alimony is to prevent the wife from
becoming a public charge, and that the criteria to be considered in determining
a 1·easonable award should include among other things the ability of the wife
to rroduce a sufficient income for herself. The evidence in this case indicated
that the appellant, a forty year old woman with no formal job training or
work experience, had no realistic ability to provide any meaningful income for
herself.

Furthermore, at the time of the hearing there were three minor

children living with her at home, the youngest of which was three years old.
To terminate alimony under these conditions would clearly indicate that within
two years the wife would almost certainly become a public charge.
ln the case of \1acLean vs. :YlacLean, 523 P.2d 862 (Ut. 1974), the
,•vir'ence showed that the wife had not been employed for 20 years and was in
111 h<>alth !although the trial court found that she was capable of gainful

P'nJ>l•wrnent).

As Rn inducement to the wife to seek gainful employment the

tri>il court lrnd onJered an annual diminution in alimony payments.

-18-

On appeal

employment.

The opinion of th<> court st:1ted:

"We deem it best that the clwnc;es in alimoll\' Pitlwr <1ownw11r<J
or upward should be left to future deter.minations ')\' the
court under its continuing jurisdiction."
In the case of Sava"'e vs. Savno-e, 658 f'.2d !:COi (l't. !Y83), soeakin';'
on the issue of alimonv, the Ctnh Supreme Court q:ited:
"We have alre11.dy noted that the parties and t11eir childrr>n
enjoyed a very high standard of living during the marriage.
One of the chief functions of an alimonv award lS to permit
the parties to maintain as much as possible the same qandards
after the dissolution of the marriage as those enjoyed r:luring
the m11rriage.
. . . where the mqrringe is •)f Jong d11r.1tion
and the earning capacitv of one spouse r;reatlv exceer1s thqt
of the other, as here, it is appropri11te to order llirnonv Hnd
child support at a level which will insure that the supporterl
spouse and children mf!y maintain a stan<1Hrd of living not
unduly disproportionate to that •vhicl1 thev "vould have c>nJovrd
had the marri11ge continued."
In the Savage case the parties were married twcntv vears, whereas
in the case at bar the parties were rrnirrierl twentv-two vears.
bar as in the Sav8.ge case the earning

of one spouse (the

greatly exceeds tilHt of the other spouse (the wife).
in passing that the l't3h Sllprerne Court cited

In the <'asc ''t

Y.S

It sliou1<1 .llso >ie noted

support for the riroposition

last quoted abovP the case of Steinbrr>nner vs. Steinbrenner. GO nr. :\oo. JOG,
li52 P.2d 845 (!Y82l.

In tlleit ca-;e Hie ')regon S11oreme f'o11rt actuallv stCJted

as follows:

-1

'"11
1

1°r" .1 rnnrriage is of long duration and the earning capacity of
''l<Juse greatly cxceeds that of the other, permanent spousal
is w11rranted . . . . " (Emphasis added.)

1

Hir

In view of the great differences in the earning capacity of the parties
i11 t11" ,.,,,P, it i' respectfully submitted that it is a gross abuse of discretion
for the trial Judge to arbitrarily limit the payment of alimony for a period of
two vears f·)l!owing the entry of the decree when there is no indication in
tile ev1dcrwe tilat within that two year period the appellant will be able to
JnC'rease h<cr f'arning capacity in any meaningful way.

In fact, the only

reasonHble nntic1pat1on at the time of the trial would be that she would not
be able to increase her earning capacity in any meaningful way within two
'.'Pllr'i

becc111se of the following factors:
Having married at age eighteen and having devoted herself for
thP twenty-two years of the marriage to homemaking and nurturing
activities, which are activites outside the labor market and which
produce no s1<ills which would suit her for employment, all factors
militate against her being able within two years to develop any
marketable s1<ills. Furthermore she will enter the job market at the
age of appraximately forty-two, when there are greatly reduced
opportunities for emplovment.
1.

2.
The partie< have a minor child which at the time of the trial
was three vears old.
The award of custody of that child to the
pla1nt1ff imposes upon her the duty to care for that child. The needs
of that child would prevent the plaintiff from exerting her efforts in
the next two years to gain skills which would adapt her for meaningful
ernplovment.
'
The plaintiff testified that her health at the time of the trial
woulrl make it very difficult for her to hold gainful employment and
lt tile same time meet her responsibilities to her children (R. 91-92).
In his test1monv the respondent recognized the impairment of the
'1e·llt 11 .1f the ripoellant and stated that he was concerned about it
·1n<I tli:;t sl1P w<lS not coping well with the situation.
(R. 128).
In this ree-nrd it should i)e noted that when the trial judge first
111 tile r>n'>l-trial ile:iring that the alimony should be paid for a limited

time only, counsel for defend:rnt sugg0stcd th:it alirnonv he n1ud for
of ten years. (R. 138).

,1

term

This C'Orresporn1" <:x:wtlv ,,it'1 the suggestion of the

husband in his financial de<'laration to the effect that "11Jimon:.• sho11Jr! Cie
awarded for a period of ten years or until plaintiff remarries or C'Ohahits,
whichever occurs earlier."

(R. 25).

Since there was nothing in the evidence to indicRte that something
might happen with two years from the time of trial which would substanti11llv
increase the ability of the plaintiff to provide for herself, but r1ther al! of
the evidence indicated that no such event would occur, it was a gross abuse
of discretion on the part of the trial court to limit the oayment of alimony to
a two year period.

Equity indicates that the award of i!lirnonv should hi!ve

been made permanent or at least indefinite as to its term.

This would not

operate unfairly as to the interests of the defendant because under Utah law
the court retains continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes with
respect to support and maintenance of the parties as shall he re11sonable 1md
necessary (Sec. 30-3-5 l? .C.A.). If something should in fact materialize (whet!1er
in two years or thereafter) which would increase the earning capRcity of the
plaintiff or decrease her necessity or decrease his ability to pay the defendant
could always move the court for an order modifyrng the amount of alimony
awarded based upon the change of C'ircumst:rnce.

L l?SIO '.'J

Based upon t11e foregoing it is re,1iedf11ll•; sutimttted thHt the trial
court grossly qtJused its disc·retion:

- 'l -

In hiling to make a division of the business awarded to the

1.

1110 ''''"r"' ,·,f tl1P marriage by reason of the joint efforts of the parties, and
In fR1ling to give proper weight to defendant's historic earning

'2.

a'nlitv

the <tandard of living of the parties and the needs of the appellant

nnd the <'h1Mren of the parties in determining the amount of alimony to be

In failing to order the defendant to pay alimony on a permanent

1.

hHs1s or !it leC1st on an indefinite basis, pending a change of circumstances of
the parties.
It is resrectfully further submitted that this court should enter an
order modifying the decree of the trial court as the interests of justice and
equitv reauire.
Respectfully submitted
VIARSHALL & WILLIS

John G. VIarshall
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